Introduction
The role of private practice in the British National Health Service (NHS) has long been a controversial issue. But as Gordon MacLauchlan and Alan Maynard have argued in most countries there has been an inevitable mix of public and private interests in health care'. (1 ) Traditionally in the NHS this has generally been understood to be the mix between the state system and private medical insurance. However, in the last third of the twentieth century this has become a more complex mix with the internal market introduced by the Conservatives in 1990 and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) championed by New Labour under the Premiership of Tony Blair. More recently, the Conservative/Liberal coalition policy for GP choice was added to heighten the complexity of provision further still. All of these instances were examples where to a certain extent, the private sector or market forces had a role within the NHS.
However, these innovations have not been the preserve of administrations over the last 35 years or so as we might at first assume. From the inception of the service in 1948 through to the late 1970s, private practice existed within the NHS through the system of pay-beds. This is especially problematic when we consider that, in the major reinterpretation of Conservative policy towards the NHS authored by Webster, which has challenged the scholarly orthodoxy expressed by Rudolf Klein, consensus was the watchword of the period while the Tories were in power.
(11)
The first part of this article will examine the financial aspects of pay-beds such as revenue, costs and the budgetary aspects of private practice. The bulk of the article will consider, in a chronological manner, the evolution of the issue of pay-beds and the changing political debates around their role in public health to 1970. A significant subtext to the study will be the changing relationship between the professional and managerial staff of the health service at both local and national levels. Klein has argued in the New Politics of the NHS that due to the influence of consultants, during the founding of the service and their continued prominence led to all aspects of management in his words being 'medicalised'. (12) In effect this meant that consultants wielded a veto over any change in the service unless done to the direct, often financial, benefit of physicians. As will be seen, suggested changes in pay-bed provision frequently had to be accompanied by a financial package. Even Barbara Castle as Secretary of State for Health had to sweeten the phasing out of pay-beds in the late 1970s with the prospect of a new contract for consultants. Essentially, interventions by senior medical staff in relation to either national or local policy were bought off. Pay-beds were also emblematic of the autonomous status of the Royal Colleges and the British Medical Association (BMA). This independence was not enjoyed by other employees in the NHS and by end of the process, although consultants were still an important part of the service, they had lost much of their influence. In this study we examine attempts to modify pay-beds at a time when the power of the consultants was at its zenith.
The creation of the pay-bed system Pay-beds were something of a compromise. It was one of the means by which the Health Minister Aneurin Bevan was able to bring on board physicians and specialists to the state system, by offering a part-time contract which would allow consultants to maintain a degree of independence and retain access to lucrative private practice. Despite some backbench Labour agitation to delete the pay-bed clauses of the act it was adopted nonetheless. (13) Although Bevan would grow to hate the compromise, as we shall see in due course, it was crucial to stop a feared mass defection of senior staff from the new NHS to independent nursing homes. Unlike the trials and tribulations of the Labour Government with the BMA over the General Practitioner service which threatened to derail the whole project in early 1948, the Royal Colleges of Surgeons and Physicians were early converts to the system. This was partly due to the largesse of Labour over contracts, which Bevan would later memorably describe as 'stuffing their mouths with gold' and also due to the personal rapport between the minister and the President of the Royal College of Physicians, Lord Moran. (14) Bevan also sought to use private practice as one of the means to spread excellence across the NHS by offering pay-beds as an inducement to specialists to move out of London and into the provinces. An indication of the dominance of the capital for senior medical staff is that at the start of the NHS in 1948 nearly half of all private beds were located in the Although pay-beds were never really seen as a means to generate extra income for the NHS, revenue was nevertheless an important issue as concerns were raised about pay-beds being subsidised or pay-beds subsidising free beds.
Both scenarios were potentially controversial politically and, as the NHS grew, concern over costs also became more salient. In addition, following the devaluation crisis in 1967, the income generated from pay-beds became the hospital-by-hospital basis within an authority). There was also a lack of direction regarding out-patient charges. Not all private patients stayed in hospital for treatment overnight and as the focus of the charge was often based on a notional rental value added to the fee of consultant, this made nonresidential patient charges appear 'purely arbitrary' to the consumer. (23) There were concerns that the smaller the hospital, the higher the cost to private patients. This appeared to be particularly the case for the cottage hospitals. The payment of full-time specialists, ancillary to treatment, who were not themselves in private practice also needed to be properly integrated into the final cost to the private patient. In sum, there was criticism of almost every area on the workings of the Statutory Instrument and the management of pay-beds. This was, no doubt, due to the fact that the focus was on the straightforward financial aspects of Section 5 facilities rather than on the clinical provision or managerial context concerned.
Chatterton suggested three alternatives to the present arrangements. The first was for the ministry to prescribe charges either nationally or regionally for private beds. Secondly, he floated the idea of creating a series of classes of bed, different classes of hospitals and a charge for treatment based on them. Essentially, the BMA sought a return to the pre-NHS approach when private rooms of 'reasonable' cost had been available. In the evidence given before the select Committee, there was an expansion of this idea. The BMA argued that the practice had effectively been to subsidise the overall costs pay-beds by reducing the maintenance cost which would then be recouped by increasing the numbers paying for a private bed. The BMA called for the levying of a hotel charge for board by all NHS patients who could afford to pay, arguing that the money raised was necessary to partly release the service 'from growing economic strangulation'. (34) On this point, the BMA was unsure of the logistics of the system, although it was supported in the principle by the RCN. However, in later discussion, the idea was not pursued much further. (35) This idea would be bandied about through the 1950s by various interest groups and politicians but never to such an extent that it would be enacted.
In terms of the BMA's specific concerns raised before the select committee, one issue that emerged during the session related to fixing costs for different procedures by surgeons. Although the Joint Consultants Committee (JCC) of the BMA worked closely with the MOH to devise the schedules, the practical workings of these schedules left the consultants relatively unimpressed. The issue was also a concern for the RCP when its representatives appeared before the committee on 12 April 1951. The RCP wanted the law of supply and demand to apply with surgeons devising a price based on the nature of the procedure. However, it was also noted that the price might start to become prohibitive and result in the number of private patients drying up-or as they colourfully put it, a surgeon cutting his own throat. (36) The final witnesses to be called in June 1951 were from the MOH led by the Chief 'Mandarin' of Saville Row, J. E. Pater, with a panel that included the Accountant General W. O. Chatterton. They were pressed for comments on a number of issues. The idea of using pay-beds as means of raising revenue which one of the committee members, Robin Turton, a future minister of health later in the decade, called 'a very powerful weapon' they declined to make any comment on the matter. (37) The did, however, challenge the assertion made by the BMA that pay-bed costs were driving private patients out of the NHS and into nursing homes. The civil servants at the MOH said that there was no evidence to back up such a claim. (38) On charges and costs for surgeons in private practice, the MOH did acknowledge that there were issues to be addressed and that the schedules for calculation required some revision, adding that the matter was in hand and discussions were being undertaken between professional bodies and the ministry. (39) The final report issued by the Committee went out of its way not to make any specific recommendations. Rather it offered observations within which a degree of implicit recommendation can be identified. Governments and the Question of Private Practice') and undermined on-going support for pay-beds and private practice in an environment where waiting lists were growing and the NHS becoming more financially constrained.
The committee also addressed the idea of charges but could not come to a firm conclusion. There were three options. First, maintain the status quo.
Second, set a nationally arbitrary charge below the actual costs to encourage uptake. Or, third, recalculate the annual cost either locally or nationally based on the previous year's actually cost derived by the category of hospital concerned. (62) The committee rejected the second option because, although it would lead to greater usage it would need such a large reduction in the actual charges that it would result in 'a net loss to the Exchequer as compared to the present position'. (63) In effect there would be a subsidy to private patients to make the bed usage numbers look good. On the third model the committee saw 'no real advantage' of a recalculation based on either a regionally or nationally defined charge as it would still result in some paying more than others. It was also felt, in the words of the report that it would not produce 'any better relationship between the charge and the value or quality of the services provided than that produced under the present system'. There is no evidence to suggest that the new charging system was deliberately devised to act as a disincentive to patients 'going private'. However, there was a fear amongst the opposition that this was the case. Opponents of private practice appeared to hope that the number of private patients would decline as a result of these plans but the attitude of the MOH was essentially to be neutral over the impact of charges.
In order to reduce the number of pay-beds, it was established that the main focus of activity needed to be on usage not cost as the chief determinant of maintenance or removal. This turned out to need a much longer time to achieve than anticipated. It took nearly four years from November 1964 until the royal assent was given to the National Health and Public Health Act in March 1968. Much of the delay can be attributed to the fact that the Labour Government had a very small majority after the October 1964 General Election and it was July 1966 before they had the majority required to be in total command of the legislative process. The review process took a considerable time. In the initial phase there was a period of policy formulation and negotiation, most significantly with the JCC of the BMA, which was not Although the offer to remove the limit on fees earned was potentially a good initial bargaining counter, the JCC was unimpressed by the potential changes in policy. In a paper circulated by consultants they argued for an increase (my italics) in the number of pay-beds. They made this suggestion in part because there had been an increase in subscriptions to BUPA and other health care companies. (89) This had shown that there was a desire for private medicine.
Moreover, the consultants were convinced that this would 'do something to lessen the financial burden on the NHS'. (90) Despite these seemingly contradictory intentions for pay-beds, in a series of meetings in July 1965 between the JCC and the MOH, agreement was reached over the lifting of limits on fees thereby smoothing the process for a review of pay-beds. (91) As had been the case in 1948, whether the process was consensual or confrontational came down to the overall attitude of the JCC and the Royal Colleges to change and the financial inducements offered byway of compensation. Robinson, like Bevan before him, was notably conciliatory over the attitude of the consultants towards change and was eager for agreement.
However, there is no indication that he had to 'stuff their mouths with gold' as his predecessor had done. On the contrary, the JCC abandoned any ambition to extend private practice for the prospect of charging more to existing patients. The minister was also aware that consultants had to be cautious over 'encourage people to make provision for themselves, the more likely we are to raise the standards of service, to reduce pressure on the National Health Service, and prevent doctors going abroad who might otherwise stay'. Services was all but complete and he would find himself shunted off to another post. (119) For pay-beds, the changing context of economic policy meant that savings had to be found but existing income streams were to be protected, assuring that pay-beds would remain part of the public/private mix in the NHS for the time being.
Conclusion
Pay-beds were initially a pragmatic response to a potential staffing crisis within the fledgling NHS that turned out to have long-term ideological and political consequences. Pay-beds as an inducement were successful in their initial objective of convincing the RCP to support the introduction of the NHS, as they necessitated the creation of part-time contracts for some physicians to continue in private practice and also to treat their patients within NHS facilities. Moreover, in this way the pay-bed system served to preserve the elite status in the medical profession of consultants, who were thus provided with an effective veto on any changes to the working conditions and contracts considered by the state.
The experience of pay-beds highlighted the evolving character of the public/private mix within the NHS. They were the precursor of developments such as the internal market and PFI in that they introduced into the public service a characteristic that was seemingly at odds with equality of access and provision, where some patients could gain advantages such as earlier treatment if they were to pay an extra charge. Pay-beds also sharpened the debate on resources as they were mostly underused with occupancy rarely above 50 per cent of the available beds. Repeated attempts to address underuse came via changes in the charging regime-for example as in 1953 that led to allegations, most notably by Bevan, that they were being subsidised to placate specialists. Under Robinson the charges were revised but at the same time the number of beds was cut to allow part-time consultants to protect their incomes while putting more bed space in the hands of hospital administrators in an attempt to cut waiting lists.
The study of pay-beds in this period from 1948 to 1970 also allows an insight into the forces and boundaries of private practice in the NHS. The forces behind pay-beds were primarily located within the Royal Colleges that sought to maintain a semblance of independence from state control. It only offered a modicum of autonomy, however, as most practitioners did not get actively involved in private practice. However, they were nonetheless determined to maintain the principle, at least in the short term. The opposing forces were led by elements of the Labour movement, but even here compromise was essential. The Labour governments of the 1960s had a general ideological inclination towards abolition, but ministers feared that an acute shortage of doctors could be made worse if it moved too aggressively to restrict pay-beds.
In addition, the financial crisis of 1967 made it impossible to press further change as it would result in public expenditure consequences. The boundaries of private practice as represented by pay-beds were intriguing. They were never intended to offer an alternative model of priorities within the NHS.
There were those who came to the conclusion that revisions to pay-bed policy would result in a slippery slope towards further expansion of private practice, which would represent a threat to the single standard of service that was the founding principle of the NHS. Additionally, there were advocates of expansion who saw pay-beds as a means by which the NHS's insatiable demand for public spending could be alleviated, However, as Powell was to observe, this might only result in a slower deterioration of the service rather than solve the problem or reverse the trend.
It is clear that the period from 1948 to 1970 was not quite the quiet time first advocated by Butcher and Randall or a period of consensus as argued by Klein. There is significant evidence of disquiet at the implications of pay-beds, their impact on resources and on standards of care and service in the NHS. Similarly, there is evidence of shifting attitudes towards the maintenance, expansion or abolition of pay-beds with Labour-previously instrumental in their introduction-gradually moving towards an openly hostile stance. Conversely, the Conservatives tested the waters of alternative funding options for the NHS which many have seen an enhanced role for pay-beds. Limiting both political agendas was the lack of an overwhelming economic case that might have legitimated expansion and minimised anxieties about the implications for staffing, especially in relation to the further loss of senior consultants that was to restrain the urge to abolish. In the interim, there was a grudging consensus that left neither side completely satisfied nor their ambitions realised.
